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THE ACTIVIST SHAREHOLDERS’ MIGRATION TO
EUROPE: HOW THE UNITED STATES CAN
RETAIN ITS WANDERING INVESTORS

INTRODUCTION
On August 13, 2013, activist investor Carl Icahn tweeted, “We currently have a large position in APPLE. We believe the company to be
extremely undervalued.”1 Apple’s market value increased by $17 billion within hours because of Icahn’s tweet composed of less than 140
characters.2 Less than two months later, Icahn again disclosed over
Twitter that he was discussing the possibility of a $150 billion share
buyback plan with the CEO of Apple.3 Apple’s market capitalization
then increased by $1 billion, causing the overall value of the company
to reach $443 billion.4 For reasons such as this, “[s]hareholders should
be tickled to death when [Carl Icahn] shows up.”5
Icahn, as well as other activist shareholders, look for publicly traded
corporations that may be poorly managed or undervalued and then
use their rights as shareholders to push for changes in the corporations.6 Examples of these changes include higher dividend payments,
share buybacks, cost cuts, and changes in management.7 While activist shareholders have often been scrutinized, the fact that their campaigns have provided significant benefits to corporations and their
shareholders is undeniable.8 For example, the stocks of corporations
that were targeted by activists between 2009 and 2013 rose nearly
1. Carl Icahn (@Carl_C_Icahn), TWITTER (Aug. 13, 2013, 11:21 AM), https://twitter.com/
carl_c_icahn/status/367350206993399808.
2. David Carr, Using Twitter to Move the Markets, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2013), http://www
.nytimes.com/2013/10/07/business/media/using-twitter-to-move-the-markets.html?ref=globalhome&_r=0.
3. Carl Icahn (@Carl_C_Icahn), TWITTER (Oct. 1, 2013, 7:23 AM), https://twitter.com/carl_c_
icahn/status/385047418284158976.
4. Carr, supra note 2.
5. Stephen Foley, Carl Icahn, Obsessive Activist Investor, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2014, 6:44 PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d4d05c84-9a54-11e3-8232-00144feab7de.html#axzz3z7pfn0RZ.
6. Tara Lachapelle & Beth Jinks, Predators Are Good for Stocks, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 4, 2014,
1:19 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-04-03/activist-investors-are-good-for-thestock-price.
7. See id.; see also Alexandra Stevenson, No Barbarians at the Gate; Instead, a Force for
Change, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2014, 6:42 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/06/no-barbarians-at-the-gate-instead-a-force-for-change/?_r=0.
8. Stevenson, supra note 7.
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forty-eight percent by the end of that period.9 Activists may have just
hit the tip of the iceberg in terms of their potential in America, but as
of late, they have begun to launch more campaigns abroad than ever
before.10 In 2015 alone, 131 companies outside of the United States
were targeted, which is a forty-seven percent increase from the previous year.11 Numerous reasons have driven this move abroad, but a
leading factor is the shareholder friendly corporate governance law
found overseas.12
This Comment argues that the corporate governance system of the
United States should be altered to reflect certain shareholder friendly
policies that are embodied in the United Kingdom. Strict, mandatory
regulations currently govern the United States, so the adoption of the
shareholder friendly policies similar to Principles 5 and 6 of the UK
Stewardship Code13 and Section E of the UK Corporate Governance
Code14 would be beneficial to American activists. The already existing strict regulations would allow for investors to obtain all of the
information they need in order to make respectable investments. The
adoption of UK shareholder-friendly policies, in addition to the existing U.S. rules, would allow activist investors and other shareholders
to work together to enact crucial changes in corporations more easily.
By combining these policies, American activists would not feel the
need to travel abroad to find more shareholder friendly laws. This
Comment contends that the implementation would trigger a domino
effect in the American market. The increase of shareholder friendly
policies would allow shareholders to reap more benefits, thereby allowing corporations to maximize their profits as well. Overall, the incorporation of parts of the UK Codes into the American system
would help activist shareholders generate even more beneficial
changes in corporate America.
Part II of this Comment first explores the work of activist shareholders and the controversy behind their campaigns.15 It then moves
to identify some of the many benefits that activists can, and have, of9. Lachapelle & Jinks, supra note 6.
10. Michael Flaherty & Sinead Cruise, Shareholder Activism Grows Overseas as US Market
Gets Crowded, REUTERS (Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/funds-activists-overseas-idUSL4N11342X20150831.
11. Id.; see also Billy Bambrough, The Revolution Will Be Monetised: Activist Investors Are
Closing in on a Record Year, CITY A.M. (Nov. 5, 2015, 12:02 AM), http://www.cityam.com/
228048/the-revolution-will-be-monetised-activist-investors-are-closing-in-on-a-record-year (“Incidents of shareholders pushing for change in Europe have risen 126 per cent since 2010.”).
12. See Flaherty & Cruise, supra note 10.
13. UK STEWARDSHIP CODE (FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL 2012).
14. UK CORP. GOVERNANCE CODE (FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL 2016).
15. See infra notes 20–35 and accompanying text.
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fered to corporations.16 Lastly, Part II explores the general corporate
governance laws in both the United States and the United Kingdom.17
Part III argues that certain aspects of the UK Corporate Governance
Code and the UK Stewardship Code should be implemented into the
United States corporate governance regime.18 Part IV examines the
impact that the implementation of these laws would have in the
United States,19 and Part V concludes that shareholders and corporations alike would benefit greatly from a merged legal system composed of both U.S. and UK policies.
II. BACKGROUND
This Part describes the role of activist shareholders and the controversy surrounding their work. This Part then discusses the dissimilar
versions of corporate governance laws found in the U.S. and the UK
that affect activist shareholders.
A. The Controversial Activist Shareholder
Shareholder activism involves attempts to bring about changes in
corporations that are not currently pursuing “shareholder-wealthmaximizing goals.”20 While there are numerous situations in which
activist shareholders have been beneficial to corporations, reaching
these goals can be a difficult task that requires activists to take actions
that executives and the board of directors oppose.21 For this reason,
activists’ poor reputation as “corporate raiders” has been somewhat
difficult to shake.22 Since their emergence, many have viewed activists as a “cult of short-term shareholder[s]” that only aim to strip corporations for cash and assets.23 During the 1980s, in a time referred to
16. See infra notes 36–70 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 71–150 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 151–296 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 297–339 and accompanying text.
20. Michael P. Smith, Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from
CalPERS, 51 J. FIN. 227, 227 (1996).
21. James Kwak, Markets Aren’t that Stupid, BASELINE SCENARIO (Aug. 12, 2013), http://baselinescenario.com/2013/08/12/markets-arent-that-stupid/ (“Entrenched CEOs and boards (and
their lawyers) don’t like this because, well, they don’t like outsiders telling them what to do and
stirring up shareholders to vote against them.”).
22. Stevenson, supra note 7 (“Once painted as greedy corporate raiders, they would amass
large stakes in a company and, through brute force, push for changes in the company’s leadership and business practices.”).
23. Capitalism’s Unlikely Heroes: Why Activist Investors Are Good for the Public Company,
ECONOMIST (Feb. 5, 2015, 11:57 AM), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21642169-why-activist-investors-are-good-public-company-capitalisms-unlikely-heroes; see also CAROLYN KAY
BRANCATO, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: BEST PRACTICES FOR
INCREASING CORPORATE VALUE 29 (1997).
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as the “takeover wars,” activists had numerous resources at their disposal, which enabled them to be highly aggressive and self-interested
while focusing primarily on short-term financial gains.24 For example,
investors engaged in “Saturday night special” raids, in which they
would attempt to take over corporations via cash tender offers.25
During these raids, investors would buy a majority of stock over the
weekend, which in turn led to an almost inevitable takeover.26 However, activists’ methods and goals have changed over time.27
Although raids of this kind no longer exist, many continue to challenge activist shareholders and their campaigns, refusing to forget the
“corporate raider” nickname.28 The opponents of shareholder activism, ranging from prominent authors and professors to business organizations and corporate lawyers, have continued to voice their
objections to these campaigns over the years.29 The primary argument opponents have championed against activism has been dubbed
the “myopic-activists” claim.30 Under this claim, “activist shareholders with short investment horizons . . . push for actions that are profitable in the short term but are detrimental to the long-term interests of
companies and their long-term shareholders.”31 The law firm
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz has launched numerous attacks on
24. BRANCATO, supra note 23, at 95; see Margaret Isa, Where, Oh Where, Have All the Corporate Raiders Gone?, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/30/business/
where-oh-where-have-all-the-corporate-raiders-gone.html.
25. BRANCATO, supra note 23, at 96.

R

R

26. Steven M. Davidoff, The SEC and the Failure of Federal Takeover Regulation, 34 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 211, 216 (2007) (“The ‘Saturday Night Special’ was a favorite: in one form, a bidder
would embark on a pre-offer buying raid to establish a substantial beachhead of ownership at a
reduced price.”). Raiders took advantage of shareholders and provided them little time and
little information before they could decide whether to sell or surrender their shares. See Andrew
N. Nagel et al., The Williams Act: A Truly “Modern” Assessment, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 22, 2011), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/10/22/the-williamsact-a-truly-modern-assessment/.
27. Since the passage of the Williams Act of 1968, corporate management has been armed
with weapons to oppose takeovers, such as poison pills and staggered board terms. See Nagel et
al., supra note 26, at 1–2, 7.

R

28. Dunstan Prial, Long-Term Reformers or Corporate Raiders: Today’s Activist Investors,
FOX BUS. (June 1, 2015), http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2015/05/29/long-term-reformersor-corporate-raiders-today-activist-investors.html (“Are they the corporate raiders of 1980s infamy . . . [o]r are they thoughtful corporate strategists . . . ? Perhaps these activists are a little bit
of both.”).
29. Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L.
REV. 1085, 1093–94 (2015).
30. Id. at 1087; see also Dionysia Katelouzou, Myths and Realities of Hedge Fund Activism:
Some Empirical Evidence, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 459, 477 (2013).
31. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects, supra note 29, at 1087.
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activists using this logic.32 Martin Lipton, a founding partner, has
been at the head of many of the attacks.33 Lipton argues that studies
portraying activist campaigns as beneficial are incorrect, as they do
not take into account how campaigns often push for short-term steps
at the expense of the corporations’ long-term goals.34 However, this
argument does not go unopposed. For example, many proponents of
activist campaigns argue that the myopic-activists claim fails because
“a company’s stock price at any moment incorporates market expectations about how it will perform for the rest of time, so it is already a
long-term measure.”35 For this reason, it is impossible for an activist
to only have short-term goals, as even short-term goals will ultimately
affect a corporation in the future. To illustrate, the following Section
describes some of the long-term benefits that activists can provide to a
corporation and its shareholders.
B. The Benefit of Activist Campaigns to Corporations
A change in the activists’ agenda over the last two decades has increasingly led more people to drop the “corporate raider” name.36 Instead, activists are now more commonly associated with increasing
shareholder value.37 Activists’ goals are now different, as they no
longer solely want to take control of a corporation in which they own
shares, but instead seek to bring about operational, strategic, and governance changes that are beneficial to, and will create value for, shareholders.38 Benefits arise when, for example, activists seek to return
excess cash to shareholders, to restructure company assets by selling
underachieving businesses and distributing the proceeds to shareholders, and to restructure corporate operations to generate greater profits.39 Activists’ methods of achieving their goals have also changed.40
32. Liz Hoffman, Wachtell Launches Another Grenade in Activist Debate, LAW360 (Aug. 26,
2013, 2:56 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/467671/wachtell-lobs-another-grenade-in-activist-debate.
33. Id.
34. See Lachapelle & Jinks, supra note 6. See generally Martin Lipton, Bite the Apple; Poison
the Apple; Paralyze the Company; Wreck the Economy, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE
& FIN. REG. (Feb. 26, 2013), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/02/26/bite-the-apple-poisonthe-apple-paralyze-the-company-wreck-the-economy/.
35. Kwak, supra note 21.
36. Isa, supra note 24.
37. See Katelouzou, supra note 30, at 461–62; see also Charles Nathan, Debunking Myths
About Activist Investors, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 15, 2013),
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/03/15/debunking-myths-about-activist-investors/ (“Activist
investing is often a useful contributor to good corporate governance and a force for company
implementation of strategies that enhance shareholder value.”).
38. See Nagel et al., supra note 26, at 2.
39. Nathan, supra note 37.
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Instead of using secretive tender offers, such as the “Saturday night
specials,” activists gain only enough control to influence both shareholders and management to adopt their ideas for change.41 While corporate raiders of the past purchased large masses of shares in order to
obtain operational control, activist shareholders now only acquire
enough shares to allow their voices to be heard.42
In response to Martin Lipton’s contention that activists do not lead
to corporate improvement, Carl Icahn stated, “Marty Lipton is completely wrong. He’s been wrong for 30 years.”43 Icahn supported this
claim with evidence of numerous successful activist campaigns.44 As
minority shareholders, many activist shareholders have brought forth
substantial and positive changes in corporate America. For example,
in 2014, Jeff Smith of Starboard Value LP launched a campaign
against Darden Restaurants, Inc. while owning less than ten percent
of the company.45 The campaign primarily focused on the fact that
Darden had ignored shareholder recommendations and concerns by
selling Red Lobster, and it also included a 300-page list of recommendations for improving the business.46 The successful campaign resulted in replacing every member of Darden’s board of directors with
individuals picked by Starboard Value LP.47 James Mitarotonda,
chairman and CEO of the activist investor group Barington Capital
Group, stated that he was “extremely pleased that necessary changes
have been made to Darden’s board and senior management team to
pave the way for the implementation of new measures to enhance

40. Id.
41. Nagel et al., supra note 26, at 8; see also Stephen Foley et al., Activist Investors Learn to
Mind Their Manners, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2015, 7:26 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/209f07
00-3ce3-11e5-8613-07d16aad2152.html#axzz42AbZni1d (“Many US activists now couch their demands as asking boards to ‘consider’ spin offs and to appoint ‘independent’ directors—rather
than the activist himself—to the board. This sits well with other shareholders . . . .”).
42. See Nagel et al., supra note 26, at 16–17; see also Nathan, supra note 37 (“Today, activist
investors rarely seek equity stakes in target companies above 10%, and their financing comes not
from the public debt or equity markets but rather through private hedge funds that they sponsor
and manage.”).
43. Lachapelle & Jinks, supra note 6.
44. See infra notes 45–55 and accompanying text.
45. William D. Cohan, Starboard Value’s Jeff Smith: The Investor CEOs Fear Most, FORTUNE
(Dec. 3, 2014, 7:40 PM), http://fortune.com/2014/12/03/starboard-capitals-jeff-smith-activist-investor-darden-restaurants/.
46. Alexandra Stevenson, Activist Hedge Fund Starboard Succeeds in Replacing Darden
Board, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2014, 10:42 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/10/activisthedge-fund-starboard-succeeds-in-replacing-darden-board/.
47. Id.
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shareholder value.”48 The new board made strides in attempting to
increase shareholder value while also approving a transaction that reduced Darden’s debt by approximately $1 billion.49 In another example, when Apple planned to have its shareholders vote on a proposal
that would make it harder for the company to issue preferred shares,50
David Einhorn of Greenlight Capital launched a campaign that forced
Apple to return part of its $137 billion cash reserve to shareholders
through buybacks and dividend payments.51 Furthermore, Bill Ackman of Pershing Square Capital Management used his campaign to
break up Fortune Brands into two publicly traded companies in order
to unlock value for shareholders.52 Beam, one of the companies Fortune broke into, has a stock price that has climbed nearly twenty-four
percent since it became independent53 and was acquired for over $13
billion.54 Lastly, Daniel Loeb not only ousted Yahoo’s CEO, who had
falsely claimed that he had a computer science degree, but also increased Yahoo’s stock price from approximately $13 per share to
$29.11 per share as of 2013.55
Beyond these specific examples, empirical evidence also supports
that there are benefits to activist participation. In response to myopicactivist claims, discussed above, that capital markets are often inefficient and that activists often have only short-term investment horizons,56 Lucian A. Bebchuk,57 Alon Brav,58 and Wei Jiang59 published
48. Leslie Patton, Starboard Wins All Seats on Darden’s Board, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 10, 2014,
3:19 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-10-10/starboard-wins-all-12-seats-ondarden-s-board-after-proxy-fight.
49. Darden Announces Record and Distribution Dates for Spin-Off of Four Corners Property
Trust, Inc., PR NEWSWIRE (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/darden-announces-record-and-distribution-dates-for-spin-off-of-four-corners-property-trust-inc-300164034
.html.
50. M.G., Apple and Greenlight Capital: Einhorn, 1, Apple 0, ECONOMIST (Feb. 22, 2013, 10:51
PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2013/02/apple-and-greenlight-capital.
51. Id.
52. Michael J. de la Merced, Fortune Brands Plans a Three-Way Split, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7,
2010, 9:39 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/07/fortune-brands-to-split-up/.
53. Michael J. de la Merced, Thank Ackman for the Beam Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2014,
8:02 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/13/thank-bill-ackman-for-the-beam-deal/.
54. Michael J. de la Merced & David Gelles, My Old Osaka Home: Suntory of Japan to Buy
Maker of Jim Beam, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2014, 7:20 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/
13/suntory-of-japan-to-buy-maker-of-jim-beam-for-13-6-billion/.
55. Nathan Vardi, Billionaire Dan Loeb Sells Most of His Yahoo Stock, Makes $1 Billion,
FORBES (Jul. 22, 2013, 10:22 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2013/07/22/billionaire-dan-loeb-sells-most-of-his-yahoo-stock-makes-1-billion/.
56. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects, supra note 29, at 1087; Katelouzou, supra note 30,
at 477.
57. James Barr Ames Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance; Director, Program on Corporate Governance, Harvard Law School.
58. Alon Brav Robert L. Dickens Professor, Duke University, Furqua School of Business.
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a study concluding that these accusations are invalid.60 The study
used objective data, as opposed to many other studies that use selfreported impressions of activists and their campaigns.61 Bebchuk,
Brav, and Jiang analyzed approximately two thousand activist campaigns that occurred between 1994 and 2007, and they found no evidence that activist interventions are followed by short-term gains that
come at the expense of long-term performance, as many opponents
argue.62 According to the study’s findings, in the five years after activist intervention, corporations’ valuations improved and shareholders continued to benefit from positive returns.63 In furtherance of this
study, Activist Insight cited that activist-targeted stocks outperform
the S&P 500 by an average of 4.3% upon the activists’ departure.64
The price per share of Surmodics, Inc., for example, increased 119.1%
within the twenty-two months after Starboard Value launched its campaign.65 Seven months after Starboard’s exit, the share price of this
small healthcare corporation rose an additional 29.4%, permitting it to
beat the S&P 50066 by 18.5 percentage points.67 Additionally, when
JANA Partners pushed for a spin-off at Marathon Petroleum in 2011,
Marathon shareholders enjoyed a 72% increase in share price in the
fifteen months after the activists’ departure.68 Here, Marathon outperformed the S&P 500 by 53 percentage points.69
Data such as this has been used to convert the skeptics of activist
campaigns to supporters. In fact, Lipton, a known opponent of ac59. Arthur F. Burns Professor of Free and Competitive Enterprise, Columbia Business
School.
60. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects, supra note 29, at 1096.
61. Id. at 1097 (“Martin Lipton, for example, wrote that his short-termism concerns are based
on ‘the decades of [his] firm’s experience in advising corporations.’ . . . Wachtell Lipton urged
reliance on the ‘depth of real-world experience’ of corporate leaders rather than on empirical
evidence.”).
62. Id. at 1100, 1155.
63. Id. at 1111, 1134.
64. Press Release, Activist Insight, Activists Leaving Companies in Good Shape (May 9,
2013), http://www.activistinsight.com/press/Activist%20Insight%20Press%20Release%20%20good%20shape.pdf.
65. Id.
66. “The S&P 500 stands for the Standard and Poor 500. It is a stock market index that tracks
the 500 most widely held stocks on the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ. It seeks to
represent the entire stock market by reflecting the risk and return of all large cap companies.”
Kimberly Amadeo, What Does the S&P 500 Tell You About Stocks?, BALANCE (Oct. 17, 2016),
https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-the-sandp-500-3305888. An investor beats the S&P 500
when the investment has a greater return that the S&P index. Amy Fontinelle, Is It Possible to
Beat the Market?, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/12/beating-the-market.asp (last visited Mar. 23, 2017).
67. Press Release, Activist Insight, supra note 64.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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tivist campaigns, wrote a letter in which he stated that activists “have
become respected members of the financial community . . . In most
cases a corporation will be well advised to meet with the activist and
discuss the activist’s criticisms and proposals.”70 Although activists
continue to be seen in a more favorable light, the corporate governance structure of the United States is still restricting their ability to
work and generate changes in corporate America. The next Section
describes the governance regime in which the activists work.
C. Corporate Governance in the United States
Corporate governance is generally defined as a “set of control
mechanisms and institutions which protect the suppliers of capital to a
company.”71 Although the definition of corporate governance shifts
depending on the party, most agree that corporate governance is a
means to benefit shareholders and increase their value.72 While there
is not one specific governing law, state law, in addition to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,73 the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002
(SOX),74 and the guidelines set forth in stock exchanges, such as the
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations
(NASDAQ) and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), are of importance to corporate governance in the United States.75

70. Martin Lipton, Some Lesson from DuPont-Trian, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE
& FIN. REG. (Apr. 30, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/04/30/some-lessons-from-dupont-trian/; see Kurt Orzeck, Wachtell Lipton Funder Suggests Settling with Activists, LAW360
(Apr. 30, 2015, 8:51 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/650253/wachtell-lipton-founder-suggests-settling-with-activists (“Lipton appeared to have changed, or at least softened, his position.
He said corporations—even ones with ‘outstanding’ CEOs and boards of directors—would be
well-advised to meet with activists and discuss their criticisms and proposals.”).
71. Shareholders are the suppliers of capital. GEOFFREY OWEN ET AL., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE US AND EUROPE: WHERE ARE WE NOW? 2 (2006); see also PETER ALEXIS
GOUREVITCH & JAMES J. SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND CORPORATE CONTROL: THE NEW
GLOBAL POLITICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 3 (2005) (“These laws define the obligations of
managers, the rights and duties of owners, the claims of shareholders, and the power of
boards.”).
72. Abdul Ghafoor Awan & Muhammad Saeed Akhtar, Problems of Corporate Governance
in USA, EUR. J. BUS. & INNOVATION RES., Aug. 2014, at 55, 56.
73. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq (2012).
74. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
75. See Corporate Governance: USA Versus Europe, VALUEWALK (Jan. 7, 2013, 12:34 PM),
http://www.valuewalk.com/2013/01/corporate-governance-usa-versus-europe; see also Adam
Dowdney, Corporate Governance in The UK and U.S. Comparison, METRO. CORP. COUNS.
(Dec. 1, 2005), http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/6173/corporate-governance-uk-and-uscomparison.
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1. State Law and the Proxy Regulation Rules
While companies may choose to incorporate in any state, Delaware
is the most favored state for incorporation.76 In fact, more than half
of the companies that make up the Fortune 500 are incorporated in
Delaware.77 This makes Delaware law the most commonly used state
law for corporate matters.78 Generally under state statutes, shareholders elect directors and vote on vital matters, directors watch officers and approve major corporate decisions, and officers run the
company on a daily basis.79 Shareholders’ substantive rights under
state law can be broken down into three areas: (1) shareholders can
elect directors; (2) shareholders can approve changes in the contract
between managers and shareholders; and (3) shareholders can approve major changes in a corporation’s structure.80 While state laws
imply that shareholders have substantial rights, shareholders’ control
is very limited.81 This is in part because directors have closer ties to a
corporation’s officers than to its shareholders,82 and also because state
laws impose strict procedural rules that negatively affect shareholders.83 For example, corporations are required to hold annual meetings, during which shareholders are able to exercise their rights to
vote on directors and other important matters.84 However, most
shareholders vote by proxy rather than by attending the meetings, so
the voting procedure is governed by strict proxy rules.85 The individual shareholder’s ability to vote for directors is part of the control held
by each shareholder86 via the corporation’s board of directors.87
Rules governing proxy votes are generally viewed as a mechanism of
protection for shareholder voting rights, but the rules have significant
downfalls for shareholders.88 The downfalls include increased costs,
delays, and substantial legal risks, all of which ultimately discourage
76. LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 1 (2007).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 533
(1991).
80. Id. at 534.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 535.
84. Id.
85. Black, supra note 79, at 535.
86. Id.
87. See Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
407, 430–31 (2006).
88. See Black, supra note 79, at 536; Stephen Choi, Proxy Issue Proposals: Impact of the 1992
SEC Proxy Reforms, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 233, 265–66 (2000).
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communication among shareholders.89 These downfalls affect not
only the average shareholders, but also the activists that set out to
help them.
2. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Stock Exchange Rules
Congress passed the Sarbanes–Oxley Act in 2002 in response to the
scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco.90 The enactment of SOX
intended to enhance corporate governance while also restoring investors’ confidence in corporate America.91 It requires that a publicly
held corporation must have a board of directors consisting of a majority of “independent” directors, that an audit committee must consist
of all independent directors, and that there must be regular meetings
held for only the independent directors.92 The NYSE furthers the
SOX standards by requiring that corporations must have corporate
governance and compensation committees that consist entirely of independent directors.93
The SOX, NASDAQ, and NYSE rules, however, have not had a
pronounced impact on the structure of corporate governance for
American corporations.94 The U.S. system is still deemed to be “regulator led,” meaning the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and
the stock exchanges are solely responsible for implementing and enforcing proper governance standards.95 In the United States, the separation of ownership and management allows managers to run
corporations, for the most part, freely.96 While a corporation’s board,
composed of both executive and non-executive directors, has the
power to oversee management, executives hold more power than nonexecutive directors.97 This power can ultimately be detrimental to
89. Black, supra note 79, at 536; see infra notes 175–93 and accompanying text.
90. Awan & Akhtar, supra note 72, at 59.
91. Julia Hanna, The Costs and Benefits of Sarbanes–Oxley, FORBES (Mar. 10, 2014, 11:15
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/hbsworkingknowledge/2014/03/10/the-costs-and-benefits-ofsarbanes-oxley/#44d856362776.
92. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq (2012)); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV.
987, 1022–23 (2010).
93. See NYSE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §§ 303A.04–05, http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCM
Tools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_4_3_3&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcmsections%2F (last visited Feb. 15, 2017); see also Kahan & Rock, supra note 92, at 1023.
94. Awan & Akhtar, supra note 72, at 60. See generally John C. Coates & Suraj Srinivasan,
SOX After Ten Years: A Multidisciplinary Review, 28 ACCT. HORIZONS 627 (2014).
95. Ethiopis Tafara, Dir., Office of Int’l Affairs, SEC, Remarks on UK and US Approach to
Corporate Governance and on the Market for Corporate Control (Feb. 8–9, 2007), https://www
.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch020807et.htm.
96. Corporate Governance, supra note 75.
97. Id.
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corporations as executives holding equity in the corporation may be
more concerned about their own financial gains, and shareholders
may not have enough control to remove these self-interested executives.98 Similarly, the board’s main role is to address conflicts of interest and self-dealing by management, but board members also have
limited involvement in the daily management of corporations.99 For
that reason, a corporation’s board of directors has a limited governance role.100
Bound by the structural limitations inherent to corporations, SOX
has not reached its full potential.101 State law—primarily Delaware’s
General Corporation Law and related common law—remains at the
center of the corporate governance regime, which has proven to be
unbeneficial to shareholders.102 For example, between 2002 and 2012,
only fifteen Delaware court decisions referred to SOX, and none of
those decisions imposed punishments for the corporations that failed
to follow the SOX standards.103 Even with the implementation of
SOX, the U.S. corporate governance system has not been greatly
changed.
3. Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
The Williams Act104 was enacted in 1968 as an amendment to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and as a mechanism of protection
against the activist investors that were deemed to be “corporate raiders.”105 As a result of the Williams Act, Section 13(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act now requires mandatory disclosure of financial and
other information for any person or group with five percent of beneficial ownership in a corporation.106 “Beneficial ownership” is defined
broadly and includes the power, sole or shared, to sell or direct the
98. Is Corporate Governance Better Across the Atlantic?, VALUEWALK (Jan. 11, 2013, 12:55
PM), http://www.valuewalk.com/2013/01/is-corporate-governance-better-across-the-atlantic/
(“[T]his absolute power [of the executives] has a tendency to corrupt or become arrogant. This
sometimes makes executives work towards personal gains rather than shareholder interests.”).
This problem is worsened by the fact that most shares are widely held and that shareholders are
not involved in the day-to-day management of corporations. Id.
99. OWEN ET AL., supra note 71, at 91.
100. Id.
101. Coates & Srinivasan, supra note 94, at 12 (describing how Delaware courts rarely cite
SOX and have never held a corporate director liable under the law).
102. Id. at 13.
103. Id. at 12.
104. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 455 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a–78u-2 (2012)).
105. Nagel et al., supra note 26, at 5.
106. Securities Exchange Act § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2012).
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sale of securities and to vote or direct the voting of securities.107
Under of this broad definition, shareholders and activist investors
alike are wary of gaining ownership that exceeds the five percent
threshold, because if the threshold is exceeded, they are subject to
higher costs, potential lawsuits, and even invasions of privacy.108
While American activists must follow these rules and regulations, the
United Kingdom takes a very different approach. The next Section
discusses the corporate governance system found across the pond.
D. Corporate Governance in the United Kingdom
While the U.S. corporate governance structure is comprised of federal statutes and state regulations,109 the UK approach relies to a
greater extent on “soft law” and self-regulatory mechanisms.110 Opposite the “regulator led” U.S. approach, the UK corporate governance system is “shareholder led,” meaning shareholders have the
power to determine what measures are necessary to protect their interests.111 Under this system, there is not a strict enforcement of the
rules and regulations as there is in the United States.112 Instead, there
is a “comply or explain” approach that allows deviation from the rules
if necessary.113 Parties must either comply with the UK codes or disclose their noncompliance with an explanation of the inability to com107. Black, supra note 79, at 542–43.
108. Id. (“The company’s managers can and often will sue claiming misdisclosure of one sort
or another, usually that the shareholder has concealed her true intent. Mere allegation of a
concealed intent is usually enough to warrant court ordered discovery . . . the SEC or other
shareholders can also seek profit disgorgement, and the cost of the suit must be borne win or
lose.”).
109. This approach is characterized by one size fits all approach that is designed to address
common governance problems. Ruth V. Aguilera et al., Regulation and Comparative Corporate
Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 23, 38 (Mike Wright et
al. eds., 2013).
110. Soft law is characterized by “comply-or-explain approaches” that allow corporations to
choose the governance mechanisms that best fir their business model. Id.; see also Anita Indira
Anand, An Analysis of Enabling vs. Mandatory Corporate Governance Structures Post-SarbanesOxley, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 229–30 (2006).
111. Tafara, supra note 95.
112. Id.
113. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK APPROACH TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2010),
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/1db9539d-9176-4546-91ee-828b7fd087a8/The-UK-Approach-to-Corporate-Governance.aspx; see Corporate Governance, supra note 75; see also NOLAN HASKOVEC, MILLSTEIN CTR. FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE &PERFORMANCE, CODES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A REVIEW 1, 13 (2012), http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/
files/microsites/millstein-center/Codes%20of%20Corporate%20Governance_Yale_053112.pdf
(“The UK codes are not firm regulations, but a roster of principles-based guidelines, compliance
with which is voluntary. If a company or institutional investor chooses not to follow one, it must
state why.”).
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ply.114 This allows shareholders, other corporations, and the general
public to understand each corporation’s approach to governance.115
The shareholder-led, soft-law approach affects the way that European corporations are governed.116 In Europe, the separation of ownership and management is not as clear as it is in the United States.117
The board of a European corporation consists of a variety of people,
ranging from majority shareholders to banks and lenders.118 The European approach allows for less room for corruption of those in management positions because shareholders of European corporations are
more involved in the day-to-day management of corporations than are
shareholders of U.S. corporations.119 These ideas are embodied in the
UK Companies Act of 2006,120 which requires the boards of corporations to focus on shareholder value.121 To ensure that shareholder
value is maximized, the Act provides shareholders with a number of
tools that can assist them in engaging with a corporation and making
their voices heard.122 These tools consist of the shareholders’ ability
to call special meetings, to remove directors relatively easily, and to
submit proposals that remain binding once passed.123 UK corporations also absorb the costs of shareholder proposals, therefore encouraging more frequent proposals.124 These are all tools that
shareholders lack in the United States.125
114. UK STEWARDSHIP CODE 1, 4 (FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL 2012).
115. Id.
116. “The fundamental legal difference between the U.S. system of corporate governance and
the Continental European corporate law system is the way they distribute powers within a corporation.” Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United States and
Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 697, 738 (2005).
117. Id.
118. See generally HASKOVEC, supra note 113.
119. “The government does not have a didactic approach because the board structure appears
to have checks and balances which prevent Directors from taking decisions which may be to
their own advantage.” Is Corporate Governance Better Across the Atlantic?, supra note 98.
120. Companies Act 2006, c. 46 (Eng.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/pdfs/uk
pga_20060046_en.pdf.
121. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK APPROACH, supra note 113, at 6.
122. Bonnie Buchanan & Tina Yang, A Comparative Analysis of Shareholder Activism in the
US and UK: Evidence from Shareholder Proposals 1, 7 (Oct. 15, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228452719_A_comparative_analysis_of_share
holder_activism_in_the_US_and_UK_Evidence_from_shareholder_proposals.
123. Id. at 7–8. Shareholders, holding ten percent or more ownership, have the ability to call
a special meeting to propose and to vote on an amendment to the corporation’s articles of association. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV.
833, 848–49 (2005). Under section 303, shareholders can call a special meeting to replace all
directors and then can do so at that meeting with a majority of votes. Id. at 849.
124. Buchanan & Yang, supra note 122, at 2–3.
125. Aguilera et al., supra note 109, at 28 (“[S]oft norms fill in voids for formal hard law and
often become an important mechanism for innovation in the regulatory sphere.”).
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The UK Corporate Governance Codes concentrate mainly on the
relationship between corporations and their shareholders.126 By
reaching for good governance practices and ultimately a successful relationship between the two parties, the Code aims for UK corporations to have long-term success.127 In order to achieve this goal, the
Code lays out a collection of standards of good practice that range
from topics such as board leadership and effectiveness to board accountability and its relations with shareholders.128 In addition to the
UK Corporate Governance Code, the UK Stewardship Code is based
on seven key principles for institutional investors.129 The Stewardship
Code focuses on the relationship between investors and companies to
help increase returns to shareholders, and ensure the efficiency of
governance systems.130 The principles of the code are as follows:
So as to protect and enhance the value that accrues to the ultimate
beneficiary, institution investors should:
1. publicly disclose their policy on how they will discharge their
stewardship responsibilities.
2. have a robust policy on managing conflicts of interest in relation
to stewardship which should be publicly disclosed.
3. monitor their investee companies.
4. establish clear guidelines on when and how they will escalate
their stewardship activities.
5. be willing to act collectively with other investors where
appropriate.
6. have a clear policy on voting and disclosure of voting activity.
7. report periodically on their stewardship and voting activities.131

Taken together, the UK Corporate Governance Code and the UK
Stewardship Code allow shareholders to reap as many benefits as possible.132 The Codes encourage discussion between investors and the
boards of corporations in which shareholders seek to implement
change.133 When UK corporations decide to follow the Codes under
the “comply or explain approach,” the boards engage with shareholders regularly and provide them with necessary information that is rele126. UK CORP. GOVERNANCE CODE 3 (FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL 2014).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 9–10.
129. UK STEWARDSHIP CODE 5 (FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL 2012).
130. HASKOVEC, supra note 113, at 10.
131. UK STEWARDSHIP CODE 5 (FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL 2012).
132. “The UK Corporate Governance Code identifies the principles that underlie an effective
board. The UK Stewardship Code sets out the principles of effective stewardship by investors.
In doing so, the Code assists institutional investors better to exercise their stewardship responsibilities, which in turn gives force to the ‘comply or explain’ system.” Id. at 1.
133. Jeffery Roberts et al., Shareholder Activism in the U.K. – An Introduction, WALL ST.
LAW., May 2013, at 1, 7.
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vant to their concerns.134 Policies such as this have led to the
successful operation of governance regimes within corporations in the
United Kingdom, causing American activists to travel abroad to take
advantage of the shareholder friendly system.135
E. The Migration of American Activists to Europe
While speaking at the University of Oxford’s Said Business School
in October of 2013, activist shareholder William Ackman of Pershing
Square Capital stated that shareholder activism in Europe was “going
to happen.”136 One month later, Gilberto Pozzi, who heads the European mergers and acquisitions department at Goldman Sachs stated,
“U.S. activists are likely to target European opportunities in the short
to medium term.”137 Ackman and Pozzi were correct, as overcrowding in the United States’ market, lower valuations, and most importantly, more shareholder friendly European laws, have increased the
appeal of moving abroad.138
With the enactment of the UK Corporate Governance Code and
the UK Stewardship Code, the United Kingdom has indeed become
one of the most activist friendly markets in not only Europe, but in
the world.139 For that reason, the United Kingdom may be the most
ideal setting for shareholder activism.140 The diverse laws and rights
in the United States and United Kingdom demonstrate how activists
may have more influence abroad than in their home arena.141 Two of
the most significant differences stem from (1) the ability of UK shareholders with just 5% of stock ownership to request a shareholder
134. Id.
135. OWEN ET AL., supra note 71, at 27–28 (2006) (“[T]he effectiveness of this system is driven
by the UK ownership and institutional structure which gives greater influence over the board of
directors to institutional investors than in either the US or Continental Europe.”).
136. Chad Bray, Ackman Sees Expansion of Activist Investing to Europe, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Oct. 29, 2013, 5:32 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/10/29/ackman-sees-expansion-of-activist-investing-to-europe/?_r=0.
137. Nathan Vardi, American Activist Investors Get Ready to Invade Europe, FORBES (Dec.
20, 2013, 8:34 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2013/12/20/american-activist-inves
tors-get-ready-to-invade-europe-2/.
138. Flaherty & Cruise, supra note 10.
139. SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP, ACTIVIST INVESTING IN EUROPE: A
SPECIAL REPORT 4 (2014), http://www.skadden.com/newsletters/Activist_Investing_in_Europe_
October_2014_Skadden_Special_Report.pdf.
140. Marco Becht et. al., Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Clinical Study of
the Hermes U.K. Focus Fund, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3093, 3095 (2009).
141. MACFARLANES LLP, ACTIVISM: 10 KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE US AND THE UK
(2015), http://www.macfarlanes.com/media/452974/activism-10-key-differences-between-the-usand-the-ukv2.pdf (“These statutory shareholder rights are extremely powerful weapons in the
activist’s arsenal.”).
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meeting, and (2) at that shareholder meeting, shareholders can remove directors with 50% of the vote, as opposed to the majority rule
that is required in the United States.142 The inability for corporations
to use poison pills143 as a method of protection against activists may
also be a leading reason for the migration, as this prevents management from blocking takeover bids and leaves shareholders with the
power to decide what to do when investors seek change.144 Furthermore, annual general meetings in the United States make it difficult
for activist investors to gain access to the board when corporations are
not taking steps to maximize shareholder value.145
In favor of both the structure and substance of the UK corporate
governance laws, shareholders are migrating abroad and taking with
them the opportunity for the U.S. market to grow and flourish.146 For
example, San Francisco-based ValueAct Capital recently set its sights
on British company and aerospace giant, Rolls Royce.147 After doing
so, ValueAct Capital acquired a 10.8% stake in Rolls Royce.148 Even
with such a large stake, Rolls-Royce “embraced ValueAct” and stated
that there was no friction; the activists and the company were working
together to turn the company around.149 The collaboration has
proven to be successful. Rolls-Royce has appointed Bradley Singer, a
142. See SKADDEN, supra note 139, at 4; see also OWEN ET AL., supra note 71, at 3.
143. See Chase de Kay Wilson, Marty Lipton’s Poison Pill, INT’L FIN. L. REV., May 1984, at
10–11. Poison Pills are strategies used by corporations to discourage hostile takeovers and protect shareholders. When a company decides that a bid for a takeover is not acceptable, it issues
tax-free dividends to shareholders in the form of preferred stock, which converts into a larger
number of common shares and creates an incentive for the shareholder to keep the stock and
refuse a tender. See David Futrelle, Corporate Raiders Beware: A Short History of the “Posion
Pill” Takeover Defense, TIME (Nov. 7, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/11/07/corporate-raiders-beware-a-short-history-of-the-poison-pill-takeover-defense/ (“Netflix’ [sic] poison pill is
what’s known as a ‘flip-in’ plan, which offers shareholders the opportunity to buy discounted
shares once a hostile shareholder has gobbled up a certain percentage of shares, usually 15%.”).
144. See Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects, supra note 29, at 849; see also SKADDEN,
supra note 139, at 4.
145. OWEN ET AL., supra note 71, at 15. For example, Berkshire Hathaway’s annual meeting
is described as having a “day-long, carnival-like atmosphere” that includes comedy skits, music
and dancing, and games. Lisa Smith, A Peak into Shareholder Meetings, INVESTOPEDIA, http://
www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/062413/peek-shareholder-meetings.asp (last visited
March 23, 2017). The business portion of the meeting only takes around 20 minutes and occurs
in a “largely scripted manner.” Id. For this reason, “[w]hile individual investors may have opinions of various topics and are able to express those opinions by putting forth proposals, the
biggest voting blocks are often the financial institutions, pension funds and similar entities that
hold large stakes in the firms.” Id.
146. Flaherty & Cruise, supra note 10.
147. Rolls-Royce Gives Board Seat to Activist Shareholder, BBC (Mar. 2, 2016), http://www
.bbc.com/news/business-35704485.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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partner and chief operating office of ValueAct Capital, to the board of
directors in order to give ValueAct a bigger voice as they work together to improve the corporation.150 Part III discusses the changes
that could be made in the United States in order to prevent more
activists from crossing the pond, as ValueAct has done.
III. ANALYSIS
In 2015, activist shareholders targeted 131 companies outside of the
United States, which is a 47% increase from the year before.151 Activists prefer to target corporations in a country such as the United Kingdom, where the laws enable them to make their desired changes more
easily.152 This preference has already turned into action as American
activists are targeting more corporations outside of the United States
than ever before.153 In 2016, the United Kingdom experienced a
forty-six percent increase in activist campaigns over 2015 figures,
which was the largest increase of any European country.154 This figure will only continue to increase if the United States’ corporate governance system is not reformed.
The United States should alter its corporate governance system to
reflect the shareholder-friendly policies embodied in the United Kingdom’s corporate governance laws. Current U.S. laws, primarily Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act and the proxy regulation
rules, do not allow activists to reach their full potential to create
change in corporate America. In order to retain the American activist
investors in the United States, the UK Stewardship Code’s fifth and
sixth principles and Section E.1 and E.2 of the UK Corporate Governance Code should be incorporated into the U.S. corporate governance
system. This combined corporate governance system would convince
150. Activist Investor ValueAct Gets Its Rolls-Royce Board Seat, FORTUNE (Mar. 2, 2016, 4:41
AM), http://fortune.com/2016/03/02/rolls-royce-valueact-board-seat/.
151. Flaherty & Cruise, supra note 10.
152. OWEN ET AL., supra note 71 at 57 (“In the UK, both public and private sector funds are
more engaged in pragmatic investor activism as compared to the US, as they do not face the
same conflicts of interests.”).
153. Flaherty & Cruise, supra note 10; Juliet Samuel, American Activist Investors Take Another Charge at Europe, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2015, 4:08 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/american-activist-investors-take-another-charge-at-europe-1429733285; see also Billy Bambrough,
The Revolution Will Be Monetised: Activist Investors Are Closing in on a Record Year, CITY
A.M. (Nov. 5, 2015 12:02 AM), http://www.cityam.com/228048/the-revolution-will-be-monetisedactivist-investors-are-closing-in-on-a-record-year (“So far this year, the UK has been a hotbed of
investor activism, with 32 so called ‘activist actions’ more than any other European country.”).
154. Chelsea Naso, Shareholder Activism Catching Fire in Europe, Asia, LAW360 (May 16,
2016, 2:44 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/796152/shareholder-activism-catching-fire-in-eu
rope-asia.
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American activists to keep capital in the United States by allowing
them to more easily enact changes in American corporations. This
Part first describes the ways in which the activists are restricted in the
United States and then details the portions of the UK law that would
be beneficial for activist investors in their homeland. Part III concludes by identifying how the United States could operate under a
merged corporate governance system combined of the favorable laws
from both countries.
A. U.S. Corporate Governance Laws Are Holding Activists Back
Majority shareholders in the United States are given various legal
rights.155 These rights range from the right to vote and to inspect corporate books and records to the right to sell shares and receive dividend payments.156 Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman of the SEC, discussed
these rights in a speech given on December 15, 2011.157 She stated,
Shareholders should have a voice and a straightforward and transparent process for engaging with companies on issues that are important to them. Shareholders and boards should have clear
conversations about how the company is governed — and why and
how decisions are made. As a general rule, interested, aware and
active shareholders are good for public companies, and I believe
that more shareholder engagement is better.158

The United States, however, has done little to ensure that shareholder
engagement actually occurs.159 The separation of ownership and management leads many managers to pursue goals that are not beneficial
to shareholders. In order to remedy this, various laws have been
passed in the United States that make many important corporate governance features the subject of mandatory regulation.160 Conversely,
instead of propelling activist shareholders forward, these laws are actually holding activists back.161 In particular, Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act and the rules that govern proxy regulation act
155. Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407,
413 (2006).
156. FRED R. KAEN, A BLUEPRINT FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: STRATEGY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND THE PRESERVATION OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE 178 (2003).
157. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Remarks at the Translatlantic Corporate Governance
Dialogue (Dec. 15, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch121511mls.htm.
158. Id.
159. For example, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act has done nothing to change the basic structure of
corporate governance in America. Awan & Akhtar, supra note 72, at 60.
160. See e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq (2012); Sarbanes–Oxley
Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201–7266 (2012); Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5641 (2012).
161. “The current state of shareholder rights is the result of an unfortunate blend of competing regulations that undermine more fundamental aspects of corporate law and therefore would

R

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-2\DPL206.txt

624

unknown

Seq: 20

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

8-JUN-17

13:06

[Vol. 66:605

as two of the least shareholder friendly policies in the United
States.162 As a result, shareholders are given little to no management
rights and are very restricted in the ways they may communicate with
board members, causing activists and the advantages they provide to
migrate abroad.163
1. Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act is often cited as a reason for lower coordinated performance in the shareholder activism
field.164 While coordinated activism would allow all varieties of shareholders to work together to create greater change in American corporations, such a situation is rare.165 The rarity of this form of activist
intervention makes the push for even stricter disclosure rules alarming.166 In March of 2011, Watchtell, Lipton, Rosen, & Katz sent a
petition to the SEC to amend section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act.167 In the petition, Wachtell requested that section 13(d) be
amended to “shorten the reporting deadline and expand the definition
of beneficial ownership under the reporting rules.”168 Specifically,
Wachtell first requested that the disclosure window be shortened from
ten days to one day after gaining five percent ownership.169 Wachtell
also requested that the definition of “beneficial ownership” be expanded to include “ownership of any derivative instrument which includes the opportunity, directly or indirectly, to profit or share in any
profit derived from any increase in the value of the subject security.”170 In making these amendments, Wachtell argued that investors,
as well as the market as a whole, would benefit.171 In similar fashion,
benefit from reform.” Julian Velasco, Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously, 41 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 605, 610 (2007).
162. See generally Awan & Akhtar, supra note 72.
163. Velasco, supra note 155, at 407 (“The history of corporate law has been one of increasing
flexibility for directors and decreasing rights for shareholders. Although the law seems to have
coalesced around the norm of shareholder primacy, this is not necessarily reflected in the specific
legal rights of the shareholder.”).
164. Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the United States,
in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 459, 461 (Peter Newman,
ed., 1998).
165. Id. (“[E]ach institution acts as a lone wolf (though hoping for informal support from
other institutions), and two institutions try not to target the same firm in the same year.”).
166. Id.
167. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Petition for Rulemaking Under Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Mar. 7, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-624
.pdf.
168. Id. at 1.
169. Id. at 3, 5.
170. Id. at 8.
171. Id. at 1.
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two Senators, Tammy Baldwin of Wisconsin and Jeff Merkley of Oregon, introduced the Brokaw Act in March 2016, in order to “rein in
Wall Street.”172 The justification for this new legislation was the belief
that activist investors are leaders of only short-term changes in corporate America.173 The bill would have reduced the ten-day disclosure
period to two days, required the disclosure of holdings that currently
do not have to be reported, and would have altered who has the duty
to report in general after acquiring at least five percent of a corporation’s shares.174
There are numerous problems with Wachtell’s petition and the proposed Brokaw Act. Tightening the disclosure rules of section 13(d)
would increase costs for shareholders.175 Shareholders would likely
lose money, both directly and indirectly, because activist campaigns
are less likely to occur with stricter disclosure rules.176 Directly,
shareholders would not be able to benefit from the higher stock returns that are associated with activist campaigns.177 Indirectly, the
more restrictive disclosure rules would discourage activist investors
from launching campaigns in the United States.178 Because activists
bear the costs of their campaigns, they will avoid situations in which
the campaign benefits do not justify the costs.179 An earlier disclosure
period would increase the costs of acquiring stock in corporations and
would increase administrative costs in complying with the SEC,
172. Antoine Gara, Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren Back Useless Bill to Regulate Hedge
Fund Activism, FORBES (Mar. 17, 2016, 5:16 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/antoinegara/2016/
03/17/bernie-sanders-and-elizabeth-warren-back-useless-bill-to-regulate-hedge-fund-activism/
#64ba5f968af0.
173. Id.
174. See Claire Groden, These Senators Want to Reign in Activist Investors, FORTUNE (Mar.
18, 2016, 3:04 PM), http://fortune.com/2016/03/18/democrats-shareholder-activism/; Liz Moyer, 2
Senate Democrats Introduce Bill to Curb Activist Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 17, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/18/business/dealbook/2-senate-democrats-introduce-bill-tocurb-activist-hedge-funds.html?_r=1.
175. Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Pre-Disclosure Accumulations By Activist Investors: Evidence
& Policy, 39 J. CORP. L. 1, 18 (2013) (“These costs arise from the simple fact that requiring
activist investors to disclose their ownership in public companies more quickly will reduce these
investors’ returns—thereby reducing the incidence and magnitude of outside blockholdings in
large public companies.”).
176. Id. at 19.
177. Id.; see Jason W. Soncini, The Brokaw Act’s Long-Term Consequences for Activists,
LAW360 (Apr. 15, 2016, 10:29 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/784189/the-brokaw-act-slong-term-consequences-for-activists (“[T]he focus on the elimination of short-termism via the
elimination of activism seems misguided. Those who decry activists ignore the positive, longterm role activists play in the economy and the profound risk of increased management entrenchment if Congress hobbles the activist community.”).
178. Bebchuk et al., Pre-Disclosure Accumulations, supra note 175, at 18.
179. Soncini, supra note 177.
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thereby reducing returns.180 With costs likely outweighing the benefits, the disclosure period would trigger an adverse effect of lowering
the activists’ incentive to launch campaigns in the first place.181 With
less activist campaigns, shareholders would likely lose money, as they
would not be able to benefit from the activist campaigns that decrease
managerial problems and increase shareholder value.182 The SEC
must examine the benefits of activist shareholder campaigns before
making any decisions regarding the petition and proposed legislation.183 If the fundamental changes of either proposal ever pass, they
will surely provide even more encouragement for the activists to move
abroad to find companies, and their jurisdiction’s laws, that are better
suited for their investments.
Activists also benefit other shareholders by increasing the possibility of a proxy fight, which plays a large role in ensuring that directors
remain accountable for a corporation’s performance.184 Activist companies have the capital to bear the costs involved in a proxy challenge,
whereas shareholders with a lower amount of shares generally do not
have the money to do so.185 Without activist intervention, “incumbent
directors and executives face a substantially reduced threat of a proxy
fight in case of underperformance, and this insulation from the possibility of a proxy fight will be likely to have an adverse effect on shareholder interests, increasing agency costs, and managerial slack.”186
The U.S. law puts these activists at a “greater disadvantage than they
face in other relevant jurisdictions.”187 In fact, the United States is the
only common law country where an “outside blockholder disclosing
its presence [must] fear being immediately subject to a poison pill”188
180. Id.
181. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects, supra note 29, at 18–19.
182. Id. at 19.
183. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and Economics of Blockholder
Disclosure, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39, 51 (2012).
“Before tightening the rules governing the outside investors who hold large blocks of
public company stock, regulators should carefully consider the valuable role that these
outside blockholders play in corporate governance, the increased agency costs and
managerial slack that would arise if outside blockholders are discouraged or suppressed, and the significant empirical evidence on the benefits produced by outside
blockholders. These considerations should play a role in the Commission’s examination
of the rules governing outside blockholders.”
Id.
184. Id. at 49.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 57.
188. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 183, at 58; see supra note 143 and accompanying text
(discussing poison pills).
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that limits the ability of activists to gain ownership in a corporation.189
A Delaware court, for example, recently held that a board could use a
poison pill to block a fair and reasonable tender offer, essentially
preventing shareholders from making their own decisions about
tendering their shares.190 Even though the shareholders were willing
to accept the offer, the court found that state law gave the board of
directors the power to make decisions for the shareholders.191 This
holding demonstrated that under current law, the only way shareholders can have a say in the corporation is through the board of directors,
and that is not always sufficient.192 This problem not only plays a role
in corporate governance, but also puts the U.S. market at a disadvantage.193 For that reason, the United States should adopt the shareholder friendly principles found in the United Kingdom so activists
will remain in the United States, thus strengthening our market.
2. Proxy Regulation Rules
Proxy Rules require that those who solicit proxies must give a written statement with various disclosures to the SEC at least ten days
before the proxy distribution mailing date so that the SEC can object
to any statements.194 This preclearance mechanism is not only expensive for shareholders, but it often delays their efforts.195 This is especially true when shareholder statements discuss director election
campaigns and oppositions to management proposals.196 In these situations, within a small time period between the date of the company
proxy statement and the date of the shareholder meeting, a shareholder must make a decision regarding the proposal, prepare and
clear the proxy materials with the SEC, distribute the proxy materials,
and get votes back.197 This problematic issue is best explained by an
analogy:
[I]magine a political campaign where each contestant, and each
newspaper commenting on the campaign, had to state a long list of
prescribed facts, including all ‘material’ facts, avoid misleading anyone, correct any prior statements which were no longer accurate,
189. Steven Davidoff Solomon, Poison Pill’s Relevance in the Age of Shareholder Activism,
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Apr. 18, 2014, 2:31 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/04/18/
poison-pills-relevance-in-the-age-of-shareholder-activism/.
190. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 108–11 (Del. Ch. 2011).
191. Id. at 129.
192. See id.
193. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 183, at 58.
194. Black, supra note 79, at 537–38.
195. Id. at 538–39.
196. Id. at 539–40.
197. Id. at 539.
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and pre-clear everything with a government agency, in an environment where the central concept of materiality has only the vaguest
of definitions and incumbent officials can use public funds to sue
their opponents claiming failure to do any of the above, with no
requirement that they show any concrete harm.198

Although it would be nearly impossible for all politicians and political
reporters alike to take such extreme measures, that is exactly what is
expected of shareholders. While attempting to make large decisions
and enact change, shareholders must work quickly and without error
to ensure that they are complying with the governing rules.199 This
creates a large obstruction in the means of accomplishing their goals.
Directly related to the ability to vote for directors is the ability, or
rather inability, for shareholders to nominate directors.200 In order to
nominate directors, shareholders must submit proposals under Rule
14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Commission, which limits the shareholders’ supporting proxy statement to 500 words.201 The proposal
must be submitted six months before the date of the shareholder
meeting, and it is also limited in scope.202 The scope of the proposal is
limited in two specific ways: The proposal cannot be used to nominate
candidates for the board of directors—one of the most important issues to shareholders—203 and the proposal may not make statements
in opposition to management proposals or for alternatives to management proposals.204 While shareholders are clearly limited in their
proxy statement proposals, a corporation’s management can oppose
statements without word limit restriction, can note the opposition on
the proxy card in bold print, and can spend corporate funds to solicit
votes against proposals they are against.205
A study conducted on thousands of corporations active between
1996 and 2002 found that there was an average of only seven challenges to directors per year.206 These challenges have proven to be
even more difficult when corporations have “staggered boards,” in
which only one-third of the board’s total number of directors are
198. Black, supra note 79, at 539–40.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 539.
201. 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8 (2016).
202. Black, supra note 79, at 541.
203. Id. at 541–42.
204. Id. at 540.
205. See Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 123, at 856.
206. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW. 43,
44–46 (2003).
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elected each year.207 When corporations are set up in such a way,
shareholders must win, at a minimum, two consecutive proxy fights in
order to gain board control.208 After examining the hardships that
shareholders must face while attempting to have their voices heard, it
is no surprise that many shareholders adopt the “Wall Street Rule.”209
This rule subscribes to the idea that it is easier to switch than fight,
meaning that shareholders may choose to simply invest in a new company rather than fight for changes in the current company in which
they have invested.210
As many activist shareholders seek to change the management aspects in corporations, it is clearly problematic that shareholders are
often willing to give up rather than to fight for their legal rights in the
corporations in which they own stock.211 For example, when shareholders decide to waive the “‘white flag’ in the battlefield of corporate
governance,” shareholders exit the corporation while the board continues to manage the company in whatever manner it desires.212
While selling the shares is a short-term solution to rid a shareholder of
a bad corporate governance regime inside of the corporation, “the cumulative effect of such acts may also profoundly impact the quality of
our products and environment, the treatment of employees, our balance of payments, and the well being of society-at-large.”213 U.S. laws
should encourage shareholders to enact changes in corporations
rather than encouraging them to abandon the corporation, thereby
creating numerous negative side effects for all of corporate America.
In order to create an encouraging environment, aspects of the UK and
207. George W. Dent, Jr., The Essential Unity of Shareholders and the Myth of Investor ShortTermism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97, 146 (2010).
208. Id.
209. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Redirecting State Takeover Laws a Proxy Contests, 1992 WIS. L.
REV. 1071, 1080 (1992).
210. Id. (“To the extent the shareholders are satisfied, they will vote for management. Disgruntled shareholders, in contrast, will have long since sold out. As a result, shareholders are
likely to vote for management even where that is not the decision an informed shareholder
would reach.”).
211. In 2013, “the most popular activist strategy was seeking board representation, followed
by the removal of a CEO or director, according to data from Activist Insight, which tracks the
industry.” Jeff Green & Beth Jinks, Activists Step Up to Revamp C Suite at Microsoft to J.C.
Penney, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 25, 2013, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201308-26/activists-step-up-to-revamp-c-suite-at-microsoft-to-j-c-penney.
212. Brandon Chen, Board Monitoring and the Wall Street Rule 2 (Sept. 20, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1659436; see Ending the Wall Street Walk: Why Corporate Governance Now? (1996), CORP. GOVERNANCE, http://www.corpgov.net/library/papersreferences/ending-the-wall-street-walk-why-corporate-governance-now/ (last visited Aug. 24,
2016) (“The reality is that if you don’t like the way the management handles your business, you
have traditionally had two choices: hold your nose or sell out.”).
213. Ending the Wall Street Walk, supra note 212.
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the U.S. corporate governance systems should be merged in order to
create a governance regime that allows for all shareholders, including
activists, to fight and implement necessary changes.
B. How to Keep Our Investors in The Homeland
In the post-Sarbanes–Oxley world, it seems likely that any reform
that takes place in the United States will entail even more rules and
regulations.214 However, the addition of stricter rules and the tightening of the rules already in place will only continue to push activist
investors out.215 Instead, some form of compromise needs to be
reached in order to keep the domestic activists in the United States.
This Comment argues that the United Kingdom is the most ideal
country from which to model a corporate governance reform. In the
UK, it is agreed upon that “shareholders are the company.”216 As a
result, shareholders in UK companies are granted more powers in relation to governance and participation than compared to their U.S.
counterparts.217 This allows normal UK shareholders, as well as activist shareholders, to have a greater chance at enacting changes in the
corporations in which they invest.218
According to the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), the intended
beneficiaries of corporate governance laws are the shareholders, and
they should decide whether or not a corporation’s governance practices are effective and allow the corporation to succeed.219 In order
for shareholders to decide what is best for a corporation in the longterm, the FRC notes that they must be well-informed and engaged
investors.220 For that reason, the FRC acts as a regulator to ensure
that shareholders have all of the necessary information to properly
assess the corporate governance tactics within corporations.221
The FRC enacted the UK Stewardship Code and the UK Corporate
Governance Code to properly regulate shareholders and corporations.222 According to the UK Stewardship Code, investors should
aim to promote the long-term success of corporations so that corpora214. OWEN ET AL., supra note 71, at 28.
215. See generally Flaherty & Cruise, supra note 10.
216. OWEN ET AL., supra note 71, at 29.
217. Iris H-Y Chiu, Reviving Shareholder Stewardship: Critically Examining the Impact of
Corporate Transparency Reforms in the UK, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 983, 994 (2014).
218. Id.
219. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK APPROACH, supra note 113, at 7.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See generally FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK APPROACH, supra note 113.
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tions, shareholders, and the economy as a whole benefit.223 The Stewardship Code thus lays out good practice principles for investors to
follow.224 In similar fashion, the UK Corporate Governance Code
lays out a set of governance standards that corporations should follow.225 These standards ensure shareholder protection.226 Although
the Codes operate on the “comply or explain” basis,227 a majority of
corporations comply with the standards set forth in the Codes, proving
that the soft-law-enabling approach of the United Kingdom is successful.228 The success of the “comply or explain” model has provoked
some to argue that the United States can and should learn from the
UK approach.229
While all of the standards set forth in the Codes are respectable, it
would be nearly impossible, and also unhelpful, to apply the Codes in
their entirety to the American legal system.230 This, in part, is because
the United States and the United Kingdom have different markets.231
The UK laws were designed to allow sophisticated and mobile investors to navigate the laws themselves.232 The U.S. laws, on the other
hand, were designed for less sophisticated investors so that government authorities could enforce the laws on behalf of the investors.233
223. UK STEWARDSHIP CODE 1 (FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL 2012).
224. Id. at 5.
225. UK CORP. GOVERNANCE CODE 2 (FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL 2014).
226. Id. at 3.
227. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
228. Corporate Governance and Stewardship, FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, https://www
.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-Standards/Corporate-governance.aspx (last visited Aug. 24, 2016).
See generally BLACKROCK, STATEMENT ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE UK STEWARDSHIP CODE
(2012), http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_278029_en.pdf; CHESHIRE PENSION FUND, UK STEWARDSHIP CODE–COMPLIANCE STATEMENT (2011), http://www.cheshirepensionfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/UK-Stewardship-Code-2011-Compliance-Statement.pdf; INFRARED
CAPITAL PARTNERS, UK STEWARDSHIP CODE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT (2015), http://ircp.com/
files/Downloads/UK%20Stewardship%20Code%20Disclosure%20Statement.pdf.
229. Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior
Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1997, 2086 (1994) (“[T]he British experience suggests two lessons for the United States: (i) Reduce regulatory controls and institutional investors
will become more active; and (ii) reduce regulatory controls and other constraints will surface
that preclude radical change.”).
230. Tafara, supra note 95.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. In her speech, Tafara analogized the U.S. market to a public roadway and the UK market
to an F1 circuit. Id. He gave the analogy that on a public roadway, regardless of if you are a
speed racer or a little old woman, the speed limit is always going to be 55 miles per hour. In an
F1 circuit, however, the speeds range at a much higher limit. Just as an average U.S. motorist
would not succeed in a Formula 1 race against an experienced racecar driver, the strict U.S. laws
would not succeed in the U.K. Id. Similarly, just as a racecar driver that is used to speeds of 190
miles per hour would not succeed at driving at a much lower speed limit along public roads, the
flexible U.K. laws would not succeed in the United States. Id.
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Additionally, if the entire UK corporate governance system was
adopted in the United States, it could potentially give shareholders
too much power, and thus take away the need for activist shareholders.234 For that reason, this Comment proposes a compromise: The
United Should apply portions of the UK laws to its governance system. Specifically, Principle 5 and 6 of the UK Stewardship Code, as
well as Section E of the UK Corporate Governance Code, should be
implemented in the United States. Doing so would allow activists to
remain in the United States and would allow them to generate their
desired changes that benefit shareholders and corporations alike.
1. The UK Codes To Be Followed in the United States
The UK Stewardship Code and the UK Corporate Governance
Code aim to ensure that shareholder protectionism methods are always present.235 Therefore, certain parts of the Codes would be beneficial in the United States in order to ensure that shareholders,
activists, and corporations can all work together for the greater good
of each party.
First, the UK Stewardship Code’s fifth principle, along with Section
E.1 of the UK Corporate Governance Code, would be beneficial for
both activists and general shareholders, as it would promote collaboration among all interested parties. Principle 5 states, “Institutional
investors should be willing to act collectively with other investors
where appropriate.”236 As guidance, the Code provides that investors
should all communicate and work together in order to achieve their
objectives.237 Section E.1 states, “There should be a dialogue with
shareholders based on the mutual understanding of objectives” and
“[t]he board as a whole has responsibility for ensuring that a satisfactory dialogue with shareholders takes place.”238 Under this section,
directors are encouraged to attend meetings with shareholders in order to understand all of the issues and concerns that are of importance
234. Samuel, supra note 153. (“Some investors say activism hasn’t previously taken off in Europe partly because laws in some European countries give shareholders a bigger voice than they
would have in the U.S., making activism less necessary.”).
235. See UK STEWARDSHIP CODE 5–6 (FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL 2012); see also FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK APPROACH, supra note 113, at 6–8.
236. UK STEWARDSHIP CODE 8 (FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL 2012); see also Konstantinos Sergakis, The UK Stewardship Code: Bridging the Gap Between Companies and Institutional Investors, 47 R.J.T. N.S. 109, 130 (2013) (“The scope of this principle is not just to extract information
about how the strategy of an investor group can be shaped along with that of another group, but
also to encourage interconnectivity between the same pools of investors in a wider context, since
they will ultimately all be affected by the company’s progression.”).
237. Sergakis, supra note 236, at 119.
238. UK CORP. GOVERNANCE CODE 22 (FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL 2014).
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to the shareholders.239 Even before shareholders become “beneficial
owners” of a corporation, boards often meet with shareholders to discuss their interests.240 Although not legally necessary, this shows how
UK corporations are willing to work with shareholders in order to
hear their concerns and maximize their value.241 The teamwork between UK corporations and their shareholders varies greatly from the
relationship, or lack thereof, between American corporations and
their shareholders, as previously discussed.242 By incorporating these
ideas in the U.S. governance regime, shareholders and the corporations could be seen as teammates, rather than, at times, enemies.
Second, the sixth principle of the UK Stewardship Code and Section E.2 of the UK Corporate Governance Code would also provide
substantial benefits for activists, and therefore all shareholders, by
continuing to promote unity between parties.243 The sixth principle
states, “Institutional investors should have a clear policy on voting and
disclosure of voting activity.”244 More importantly, this rule specifies
that investors should not automatically support the board of a corporation in which it owns shares.245 Section E.2 states that “the board
should use general meetings to communicate with investors and to encourage their participation.”246 Under this section, when resolutions
are proposed, shareholders may vote either for or against the resolution via proxy forms.247
While U.S. shareholders must rely entirely on the board of a corporation for the protection of their benefits, UK boards work as delegates or agents of the shareholders.248 Considering that board
members owe fiduciary duties to the corporation itself, instead of the
shareholders, the benefits of U.S. shareholders are not always adequately protected.249 Conversely, board members in the UK owe
their fiduciary duties to the corporation’s shareholders, therefore ensuring adequate shareholder protection.250 The benefits of these laws
can be seen in the takeover talks between Pfizer and the UK’s As239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id.
Roberts et al., supra note 133.
Id.
See supra notes 71–135 and accompanying text.
UK STEWARDSHIP CODE 5 (FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL 2012).
Id. at 9.
Id.
UK CORP. GOVERNANCE CODE 22 (FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL 2014).
Id.
OWEN ET AL., supra note 71, at 26.
Id. at 29.
Id.
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traZeneca.251 The decision of whether the takeover would take place
or not was left in the hands of the board.252 However, because of the
UK Codes, this decision was actually in the hands of the shareholders.253 For that reason, the takeover did not occur because the shareholders felt uneasy about the payments they would receive from their
holdings of shares in the combined corporation.254 The denial of this
takeover by the AstraZeneca’s shareholders exemplifies the role the
Code plays in the day-to-day business of UK corporations, as well as
the power that the shareholders hold.255
These provisions of the UK Codes give UK shareholders more
power than U.S. shareholders. It is easier for activists in the UK to
not only have their voices heard, but also to get their own candidates
to become members of the board.256 This allows UK activists to use a
less hostile approach than is used by activists in the United States.257
The activists do not “start a relationship with a lecture” or look for
proxy fights; instead, the activists use a friendlier approach, in which
they present their ideas with “solid arguments and solid facts.”258
They are able to work openly and patiently with shareholders in order
to gain their support.259 Therefore, instead of using the “Wall Street
Rule” that is used by many American shareholders, UK shareholders
are able to simply speak with board members when they do not like
what the corporation is doing.260 To illustrate, when activists send let251. Roger Barker, Pfizer’s Pitch for AstraZeneca Reveals British Protectionism in a Global
World, CNN (May 13, 2014, 6:27 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/13/business/pfizer-astrazene
ca-roger-barker/.
252. Id. (describing how the board is made up of shareholders).
253. Under the Code, “directors are explicitly required to deliver success over the long-term.”
Id.
254. Id.; see also Ben Hirschler & Bill Berkrot, Pfizer Walks Away from $118 Billion AstraZeneca Takeover Fight, REUTERS (May 26, 2014 11:55 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2014/05/26/us-astrazeneca-pfizer-idUSBREA3R0H520140526#pUSVPR7oqkzZc8Kl.97 (“BlackRock, AstraZeneca’s biggest shareholder, backed the board’s rejection of Pfizer’s 55 pounds a
share offer.”).
255. Tafara, supra note 95 (“Although the board may have a comparative advantage in making ordinary business decisions, the board has no advantage over the shareholders when it comes
to deciding whether or not to sell the company to a bidder. That decision is simply a variation of
the decision whether to buy or sell shares in the first place.”).
256. Jen Wieczner, Meet Europe’s Best Activist Investor: Cevian’s Christer Gardell, FORTUNE
(Aug. 27, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/08/27/christer-gardell-activist-investor-europe/.
257. Id.
258. Id.; see also Samuel, supra note 153. According to Steven Brown, the chief executive of
GO Investment Partners, “In Europe, you don’t have to shout to get anywhere . . . . We approach companies and boards privately with a view to changing strategy.” Id.
259. Activism: 10 Key Differences, supra note 141.
260. Alison Smith, Activist Investors Can Find the UK a Tricky Destination, FIN. TIMES (Dec.
18, 2013, 7:59 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/96fd7292-67fb-11e3-8ada-00144feabdc0.html#
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ters to corporations in an attempt to discuss possible changes, UK corporations will generally answer the letters and seek the activists’
opinions.261 U.S. corporations, on the other hand, are much less responsive.262 Activists abroad “have no problem at all in meeting management or chairmen or non-executive directors of any listed
company in the UK.”263 Meanwhile, due to its lack of shareholderfriendly laws, the U.S. continues to be one of the most difficult environments to work in.264 The positive UK results, however, could be
mimicked for U.S. investors if the applicable sections of the UK
Codes were to be implemented in the United States. The following
Sections discuss how this could be done.
2. A Merged Governance System
The current corporate governance law in the United States stands
out among the governance systems of other countries because of its
restrictions on shareholders.265 Not all people, however, see this as a
bad thing. For example, Jack Welch, the former chief executive officer
of General Electric, believes that “shareholder value is the dumbest
idea in the world.”266 From his position, corporations need to stop
focusing on shareholder value, and begin focusing on other aspects of
the corporation, such as creating jobs, building factories, and producing a good work product.267 However, this viewpoint overlooks the
fact that when corporations place an emphasis on shareholder value,
corporations function better overall.268 Unfortunately, shareholder
axzz3sjHmd9s9; see also Jonathan Marino & Matt Turner, Activist Investors Keep Colliding –
And It’s Forcing the Industry to Transform, BUS. INSIDER (Sep. 12, 2015, 12:55 AM), http://www
.businessinsider.com/wall-streets-activist-investors-are-heading-overseas-2015-9 (“Activists are
much more likely to operate behind the scenes outside the US, exhorting company management
to change strategy in private.”).
261. Gretchen Morgenson, Belated Apologies in Proxy Land, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/20/business/yourmoney/20gret.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
262. Id.
263. BOB WEARING & YUVAL MILLO, CTR. BUS. PERFORMANCE, ACTIVIST INVESTORS IN UK
QUOTED COMPANIES AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 21 (2011), https://
www.icaew.com/~/media/corporate/files/technical/corporate%20governance/uk%20corporate%
20governance/tecpln10783%20activist%20investor%20report%20final%20reduced.ashx.
264. Morgenson, supra note 261.
265. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 123, at 848.
266. Francesco Guerera, Welch Denounces Corporate Obsessions, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2009,
2:00 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3ca8ec2e-0f70-11de-ba10-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz4FuNnx
Hht.
267. Andre Spicer, Why Shareholder Value Is the ‘Dumbest Idea in the World, CNN (Jan. 24,
2014, 6:36 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/24/business/davos-shareholder-value-is-dumbestidea/index.html.
268. See Justin Fox & Jay W. Lorsch, What Good Are Shareholders?, HARV. BUS. REV., JulyAug. 2012, at 48, 50.
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value continues to be overlooked.269 This is due, in part, to shareholders having minimal decision-making powers and corporate managers
focusing on their own profits instead of shareholder value, in addition
to the waves of scandal that seemingly plague corporate America.270
Therefore, outside investors, such as activist shareholders, are needed
to ensure the proper functioning of American corporations.271 In fact,
when investors such as activist shareholders hold more than five percent of outstanding shares in a corporation, the corporation is better
governed, the executive pay is more reasonable, and the corporation
as a whole outperforms its competitors.272
For that reason, the United States should adopt a “hybrid governance regime” that will give shareholders a greater voice.273 According
to Anita Anand, “[A]n enabling governance regime coupled with
mandatory disclosure of a firm’s governance practices is likely to yield
a high level of compliance at lower costs than a wholly mandatory
regime.”274 By retaining the mandatory disclosure laws that are already in place in the U.S., investors will have the information that
they feel is necessary for them to make accurate investment decisions.275 The “comply or explain” provisions of the UK Codes would
work alongside these rules to accommodate and promote innovative
shareholder ideas as shareholders and all sectors of the corporation
would be operating together to maximize value.276
The changes that activist investors make promote more effective
governance inside of the corporation, which in turn leads to the enhancement of shareholder value.277 It is a domino effect that is trig269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 56.
272. Id. at 55.
273. Anand, supra note 110, at 232.
274. Id. at 230.
275. Id. at 248–49 (“The disclosure enables investors to react to governance choices on the
basis of full information.”).
276. INST. OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES, WHEN IS COMPLY OR
EXPLAIN THE RIGHT APPROACH?, http://www.icaew.com/-/media/corporate/files/technical/corporate-governance/dialogue-in-corporate-governance/icaew-tl-q3-web.ashx?la=en (“This is particularly important in a complex area like corporate governance: it is about human behaviour,
interaction and decision making which are most effective when companies act out of their own
will, rather than being forced to change through structures and procedures.”).
277. Lisa M. Fairfax, Shareholder Democracy on Trial: International Perspective on the Effectiveness of Increased Shareholder Power, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 1, 3 (2008) (“Professor Lucian
Bebchuk notably argues that increasing shareholder democracy would improve corporate governance and enhance managerial accountability. Indeed, Bebchuk and others contend that augmenting shareholder power will make directors and officers more accountable to shareholders,
thereby curbing abuses of authority and the incidence of misconduct. In Bebchuk’s view, in-

R

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-2\DPL206.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 33

8-JUN-17

SHAREHOLDERS’ MIGRATION TO EUROPE

13:06

637

gered by the activists.278 However, if U.S. activists do not have the
adequate tools to make these essential changes, the dominos cannot
fall into their rightful place and shareholders will not be able to maximize their profits.279 UK shareholders are given the authority to decide what corporate governance measures are necessary and what is
appropriate to protect their interests, so they have a better chance of
seeing the changes that they want.280 This idea should be incorporated in the United States.
C. But How Can a Merged Governance System Be Imposed?
The convergence of various international corporate governance systems has been the subject of debate over the last decade, making the
possibility of a U.S. and UK merged governance system a true possibility.281 Opponents of conversion argue that governance systems and
corporations’ objectives “tend to reflect the institutional and historical
differences in legal, political, social and cultural systems.”282 While
this is true, the divergence of cultures is not problematic in this case,
as the U.S. and UK are very similar in many respects. In fact, the UK
and the U.S. are deemed to have a “special relationship” due to their
similar political, diplomatic, cultural, economic, and historical relations.283 However, the markets of the two countries are different.284
This is why the entirety of the UK governance system cannot override
the current U.S. corporate governance system. While this is true,
there is no reason that small portions of the UK Codes cannot be
merged with U.S. law to create the best possible arrangement for activist shareholders.
creased shareholder democracy should translate into improved shareholder value.” (footnotes
omitted)).
278. Id.
279. James McConvill, How Large Companies Can Make Shareholders Happy, AGE (Dec. 22,
2005), http://www.theage.com.au/news/business/how-large-companies-can-make-shareholdershappy/2005/12/21/1135032080136.html (“[P]roponents of shareholder empowerment view shareholder governance rights as being a means to an end, rather than an end in itself. The ‘end’
which connects both proponents and opponents in their analysis is maximizing company performance—making the company as healthy as possible in governance terms to achieve more
profits.”).
280. See FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK APPROACH, supra note 113, at 3; see also UK
CORP. GOVERNANCE CODE 4 (FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL 2014).
281. Brian Ikol Adungo, An Analysis of the View that the Corporate Governance Systems
Wordwide Are Inevitably Converging Towards a Model Based on Shareholder Primacy and Dispersed Ownership Structure § 1 (May 2, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2049764.
282. Id. § 4.
283. See Winston Churchill, Iron Curtain Speech at Westminster College (Mar. 5, 1946).
284. See supra notes 230–34 and accompanying text.
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While the creation of a merged legal system would be a timely process controlled by legislative action, the process can begin immediately with the reform of governance practices within corporations.285
Beginning immediately, U.S. corporations can include the applicable
shareholder protection provisions in their articles of incorporation on
a “comply or explain” basis, thus creating structural and shareholderoriented changes within the corporation.286 The provisions could be
tailored to the specific corporations, and thus would be more effective
than a “comply or else” approach that is present and must be followed
by all corporations in the United States today.287 As a comply or explain approach, the corporation would be able to deviate from the
provisions as long as it was in the best interest of the shareholders.288
If the corporation did find it necessary to deviate, it would be required
to release a public statement explaining the deviation.289 In order for
this to work properly, the activist shareholders and normal shareholders would need to work together to monitor the corporations and ensure that the deviation was, in fact, in the best interest of the
shareholders.290 Assuming that the corporations would either comply
or choose to make other shareholder beneficial decisions, the approach would undoubtedly be a success.
The success of corporations that implement the shareholder friendly
governance practices would then increase the odds of creating a true
legally merged system.291 This is because the shareholders that benefit will “create an interest group to press for reforming corporate governance to encourage value-enhancing practices.”292 In other words,
after gaining benefits within corporations with altered corporate governance policies, shareholders will undoubtedly come together to
press for gradual changes that will mimic the changes already implemented within the complying corporations.293
When the time comes for the shareholders to push for a legal convergence, the argument for reform should be modeled on the Brazil285. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law 1, 17
(Yale Law Sch., Working Paper No. 235, 2000), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=204528.
286. Id. at 2–3.
287. Subrata Sarkar, The Comply-Or-Explain Approach for Enforcing Governance Norms
1–2 (Indira Gandhi Inst. of Dev. Research, Working Paper No. WP-2015-022, 2015), http://www
.igidr.ac.in/pdf/publication/WP-2015-022.pdf.
288. Id. at 4.
289. Id. at 6–8.
290. Id.
291. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 285, at 17, 25–26.
292. Id. at 25–26.
293. Id. at 18.
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ian Stock Exchange reform of 2000.294 There, in order to better
protect investors while also aiming to increase the capital market’s
value, Brazil implemented a “dual regulatory regime,” in which corporations were allowed to choose from four levels of listing requirements with shareholder protection increasing at each level.295 The
system allowed each corporation to choose the requirement that best
fit its needs while still protecting shareholders at each level and attracting new sources of capital.296 Although a system such as this cannot be put into place over night, it is the best way to ensure that
corporate America is the greatest that it can be, as corporations could
choose from a varying degree of shareholder friendly policies in order
to suit the needs of their business. By slowly transitioning to a merged
corporate governance system, average shareholders and activist shareholders would be given more power and be better able to communicate with corporations to generate changes to improve all involved
parties. The next Part discusses how each party would benefit from
these changes in the corporate governance system.
IV. IMPACT
Corporate governance is at the center of some of the country’s most
important issues.297 It affects the creation and distribution of wealth,
it influences social mobility, stability, and fluidity, as well as social security and retirement plans.298 In other words, corporate governance
laws touch on most of the issues that activist shareholders seek to
change.299 For that reason, U.S. shareholders, including those that are
activists, must be well informed because “[a]n informed shareholder is
the best visionary, planner and evaluator an organization can count
on.”300 Offering feedback on proposed ideas, discussing new strategies, and providing insight into the day-to-day management operations will ensure shareholder involvement.301 If the American
activists are better informed due to the implementation of the applica294. Aguilera et al., supra note 109, at 28.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 71, at 3.
298. See id.
299. Activists push for changes in company’s leadership and business practices. See Stevenson, supra note 7.
300. Nitin Mamillapally, Shareholders or Stakeholders – Who Is More Important?, LINKEDIN
(Jun. 19, 2014), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20140619213822-24445561-shareholders-orstakeholders-who-is-more-important.
301. Id.
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ble sections of the UK Codes, they will be able to generate great
changes that benefit both shareholders and corporations at large.
This can be accomplished effectively through a “hybrid governance
regime.”302 By combining the UK shareholder-friendly policies with
the strict, mandatory regulation schemes already in place in the
United States, activists would be able to work hand-in-hand with
shareholders more easily. In doing so, activists would then be able to
generate changes that benefit shareholders and the corporations in
which they invest.303 With this power, activists will no longer need to
look abroad for business opportunities, as they will have all of the
necessary tools to enact change in their home country.304 By working
within a merged, hybrid corporate governance system, activist shareholders would be better suited to ensure that shareholder value would
be of great importance within corporations. However, not only shareholders would benefit under this regime, because corporations would
excel alongside of their shareholders.305 This notion is further discussed in the following Sections.
A. Shareholders Will Reap More Benefits
When activists buy shares in a corporation, they seek to make
changes in management and in the boardroom that benefit all shareholders.306 Activists have the ability to make changes that will move a
company in a new direction as long as the company’s other shareholders agree that the changes are desirable and beneficial.307 When
shareholders’ voices are restricted, this is a difficult task. However, by
302. Anand, supra note 110, at 232.
303. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 123, at 842–43 (“I do
not view increasing shareholder power as an end in and of itself. Rather, effective corporate
governance, which enhances shareholder and firm value, is the objective underlying my analysis.
From this perspective, increased shareholder power would be desirable only if it would operate
to improve corporate performance and value.”).
304. Aguilera et al., supra note 109, at 2 (“Effective corporate governance entails mechanisms
to ensure executives respect the rights and interests of company stakeholders, as well as guarantee that stakeholders act responsibly with regard to the generation, protection, and distribution
of wealth invested in the firm.”).
305. Matt Krantz, Activist Investors Often Cause More Good than Harm, USA TODAY (May
3, 2016, 8:30 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/markets/2016/05/03/activist-investorsoften-cause-more-good-than-harm/83841952/ (“Activists, and companies that adopt activist
thinking, often focus on improving their return on invested capital. This is a financial measure
that tells you how much profit is driven out of the money entrusted to the company by
investors.”).
306. Bret Kenwell, Nelson Peltz – Activist Investors Benefit All Shareholders, THESTREET
(Apr. 2, 2015, 3:23 PM), https://www.thestreet.com/story/13100807/1/nelson-peltz—activist-investors-benefit-all-shareholders.html.
307. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 183, at 50.
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allowing activists to work closely with other shareholders, activists’
success rates in altering the corporation’s governance structure and
increasing shareholder wealth would soar.308 By working together, activists and shareholders would be better able to address governance
flaws more successfully.309 This would cause directors and officers to
be more accountable to shareholders, thus allowing for an increase in
shareholder benefits.310
In a time where companies are holding more cash on their balance
sheets than ever before, activists are fighting for corporations to give
the money back to shareholders through dividend payments and share
buybacks.311 For this reason, activists are considered “rock stars” who
are both advocates and “watchdogs” for all shareholders.312 In 2013,
for example, activists returned eighteen percent back to shareholders,
compared to the average nine percent seen throughout the rest of the
corporate market.313 This percentage of return can grow even larger
if the U.S. is exposed to a merged corporate governance system. Activists abroad have been extremely successful in positively influencing
share values through corporate governance practices that increase
shareholder participation.314 By creating a hybrid governance system,
the United States could adopt the same ideals and thereby create the
same effects, further enhancing the U.S. capital market as a whole.
B. More Change Leads to More Value for Corporate America
Ensuring shareholders’ satisfaction by giving them greater power is
important, but it is the not the “end game.”315 Shareholders will undoubtedly receive better benefits with more help from shareholder activists,316 but the value of the targeted firms will also increase as
308. Michael P. Smith, Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from
CalPERS, 51 J. FIN. 227, 251 (1996) (“[E]vidence indicates that shareholder activism is largely
successful in changing governance structure and, when successful, results in a statistically significant increase in shareholder wealth.”).
309. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 123, at 913.
310. Fairfax, supra note 277, at 3.
311. Rana Foroohar, Shareholder ‘Activists’ – Are They Good Or Bad?, TIME (Mar. 26, 2014),
http://time.com/38487/shareholder-activists-are-they-good-or-bad/. Apple, for example, had a
cash hoard of nearly $200 billion in 2015. Sarah Whitten, Just How Much Cash Does Apple
Have?, CNBC (Oct. 28, 2015, 10:16 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/28/just-how-much-cashdoes-apple-have.html.
312. Nathan Vardi, The Golden Age of Activist Investing, FORBES (Aug. 6, 2013, 8:25 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2013/08/06/the-golden-age-of-activist-investing/.
313. Stevenson, surpa note 7.
314. Fairfax, supra note 277, at 3.
315. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 123, at 842–43.
316. See supra notes 306–14 and accompanying text.
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well.317 Prior to 1994, most evidence showed that activist shareholders
had a minimal effect on overall firm performance; however, recent
studies find that shareholders and activists, when working together,
are associated with a positive long-term effect in corporations.318 In
fact, “proposals sponsored by blockholders have a large measured effect on nearly all aspects of firm performance.”319
While the benefits created by activists are prevalent in the United
States already, they may cease to exist if activists continue to move
abroad. The addition of the shareholder friendly UK policies will
keep activists in the U.S. and will lead to even more beneficial
changes in corporate America. In the UK, direct communication between shareholders and management is very common, causing companies to open themselves up to activist shareholder engagement.320
The added UK policies would allow for the communication lines to
not only open between activists and other shareholders, but also between activists and U.S. corporations’ management. American activists would then be able to successfully use a “suggestivist” approach
when attempting to enact changes.321 Instead of launching aggressive
campaigns and potentially embarrassing the CEOs of corporations,
activists would act as “suggestivists” by cordially discussing their plans
with corporations’ management.322 Activist engagement occurs in the
UK by using this approach to influence corporations rather than using
legal threats and confrontational practices.323 By following this tactic,
U.S. activists can work hand-in-hand with shareholders and the companies’ boards alike to affect changes.
A study conducted at the London Business School found a “high
correlation between enhanced firm value and shareholder activism.”324 The authors noted that the correlation between value and
317. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 123, at 842–43.
318. Bonnie G. Buchanan et al., Shareholder Proposal Rules and Practice: Evidence from a
Comparison of the United States and the United Kingdom, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 739, 746 (2012)
(“[I]mprovement is greater when shareholder proposals are sponsored by blockholders.”).
319. Id. at 788.
320. John Hendry et al., Responsible Ownership, Shareholder Value and the New Shareholder
Activism 1, 8 (Univ. of Cambridge ESRC Ctr. for Bus. Research, Working Paper No. 297, 2004),
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/centre-for-business-research/downloads/working-papers/wp297.pdf.
321. Vardi, The Golden Age of Activist Investing, supra note 312.
322. Id.
323. Kate Burgess, Confrontational Activism Rare in the UK, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2016, 2:23
PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d39997a0-a3f2-11e5-8218-6b8ff73aae15.html#axzz3zVkXp
Cw8.
324. Fairfax, supra note 277, at 25. See generally Marco Becht et al., Returns to Shareholder
Activism: Evidence from a Clinical Study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund, 22 REV. FIN. STUD.
3094 (2009).
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activism is not as prevalent in the United States because of the poor
current governance mechanisms currently set in place.325 However,
reforming the U.S. governance system to incorporate the UK policies
that are more favorable for activism will increase the chance that activism will have an even greater positive impact on targeted
corporations.326
Opponents have continuously overlooked the evidence that shareholder activism can, and does, improve target companies’ operations.327 Opponents are greatly concerned with the activist’s push for
higher dividend payments, arguing that the higher payment could
leave a corporation with fewer resources for future investments.328
However, “opponents . . . overlook that reducing cash holdings and
investments might actually move companies closer to, rather than
away from, the levels that are optimal for the long term.”329 When a
company issues a dividend payment that is higher than expected, the
company’s stock prices increase as investors become interested that
the company is perhaps growing.330 Although issuing dividend payments means that money is leaving a corporation, the payments attract more investors.331 This essentially allows the company to earn
back what it has lost through new investors.332 When looking at the
impact in such a way, it is clear that increasing dividend payments also
increases firm value.333
In looking beyond the effects of dividend payments, several commentators published a study that documented a positive seven percent
stock return after filing a disclosure statement that an activist was investing in a company.334 Although disclosure laws have at times
325. Becht et al., supra note 324, at 3094.
326. Id.
327. Jonathan M. Karpoff, The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Target Companies: A Survey of Empirical Findings 4 (Aug. 18, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=885365.
328. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects, supra note 29, at 1136.
329. Id.
330. How Dividends Affect Stock Price, SCOTTRADE (Jul. 1, 2014), https://about.scottrade
.com/blog/blogposts/How-Dividends-Affect-Stock-Price.html.
331. Id.
332. Id.; Claire Boyte-White, How Dividends Affect Stock Prices, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 10,
2015, 11:15 AM), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/091015/how-dividends-affectstock-prices.asp (“When companies display consistent dividend histories, they become more attractive to investors. As more investors buy in to take advantage of this benefit of stock ownership, the stock price naturally increases, thereby reinforcing the belief that the stock is strong. If
a company announces a higher-than-normal dividend, public sentiment tends to soar.”).
333. Fairfax, supra note 277, at 3.
334. Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance,
63 J. FIN. 1729 (2008).
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harmed activist campaigns, this suggests that shareholders, as well as
potential future shareholders, believe that activist campaigns create
value in their target companies.335 These shareholders are correct, as
“target firms experience increases in payout, operating performance,
and higher CEO turnover after activism.”336 These benefits are not
short term, as some suggest, as in the five-year period after the activist
intervention the gains continue to exist.337
Because shareholders directly affect the “health and efficient functioning of U.S. capital markets,” it is problematic that U.S. shareholders have fewer rights than most other foreign shareholders.338 While
the benefits that corporate America has already experienced due to
activist campaigns is significant, even larger and more important benefits can be achieved if the U.S. creates a merged corporate governance
system. However, if more rights are not given to shareholders and the
investors who fight for them, it is likely that activists will continue to
launch more campaigns abroad, eventually leaving the American markets behind completely. In order to avoid their departure, it is vital to
remember the benefits that activists bring forth and make changes to
the corporate governance system accordingly.
V. CONCLUSION
While the UK corporate governance system as a whole would not
be an adequate fit in the United States,339 the United States should
incorporate a subset of its policies into its own corporate governance
system. By implementing the fifth and sixth principles of the UK
Stewardship Code, as well at Section E.1 and E.2 of the UK Corporate Governance Code, into the current U.S. regulatory scheme, activist shareholders will have access to all of the tools in which they
need to generate beneficial changes. The merged governance system
will allow activists to work closely with corporations’ shareholders and
board members in order to enhance both the shareholders’ and corporations’ values. Carl Icahn was able to raise Apple’s market value by
$18 billion using less than a mere 280 characters in a country that has
proven to be shareholder unfriendly. With a merged corporate governance system created from the finest UK and U.S. governance poli335. Id.
336. Id.
337. John Carney, Welcome to the Golden Age of Activist Investors, CNBC (Aug. 14, 2013,
3:37 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100963166.
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cies, Icahn and other activist investors will be able to bring forth even
more beneficial changes in corporate America. That possibility
should excite shareholders and corporations alike.
Julia Potts*

* J.D. Candidate, DePaul University College of Law, 2017.
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